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Abstract. Recent technologies for low-rate, long-range transmission in unlicensed
sub-GHz frequency bands enables the realization of Long-range Wide Area Net-
work. Despite the rapid uptake of LPWANs, security concerns arising from the
open architecture and usage of the unlicensed band are also growing. While the
current LPWAN deployments include basic techniques to deal with end-to-end
encryption there are specific security issues that arise due to the overall architec-
ture and protocol layer design. In this paper, a new scheme to establish end-to-end
secure communication in long-range IoT deployments is introduced. The advan-
tages over the existing approaches and architectural design are presented in the
context of typical smart cities application scenarios.
1 Introduction to Security Issues & Vulnerabilities in LPWAN
In the past few years, the approach of exploiting sub-GHz was proposed in order to
increase the transmission range of nodes by trading-off data transmission rate while
keeping power consumption at low levels [1]. This so-called Low-Power Wide Area
Networks (LPWANs) allow IoT devices to connect to Concentrators (also called a col-
lector) over distances in the range of several kilometres. Concentrators forward data
received from the IoT devices to a Network Server (over for example Ethernet or
3G/4G/5G) that manages all the decoding of the packets and handles redundant trans-
missions. Overall, LPWANs are considered promising candidates for IoT applications,
since they allow high energy autonomy of the connected devices, low device and de-
ployment costs, high coverage capabilities and support large number of devices [2].
Recently some technical papers concentrated on the security vulnerabilities in LP-
WANs providing alternative solutions for the used cryptographic primitives [3], focus
on application server vulnerabilities [4] or introduce alternative key management [5].
In LPWANs the encryption of the payload is by default enabled in every transmis-
sion. The data frame of an end-node has a 32-bit identifier, a 7-bit network identifier and
a 25-bit network address and the maximum payload is 250 Bytes. Since IoT devices are
not assigned to a specific concentrator, the data frames do not include any concentrator
identifier. In this way, it is possible for anyone to receive the encrypted data packets. In
order to prevent from replaying packets, a frame counter is used both for upstream and
downstream messages which will block a transmission from being sent more than once.
Two different 128-bit AES keys are used for a two-step message chain for both up-
stream and downstream message exchanges. In the first step, an Application Session
Key (AppSKey) is used to encrypt the data frame between the IoT device and the appli-
cation server. In the second step, a Network Session Key (NwkSKey) is used to verify
the authenticity of the nodes. The data frame exchanged between the IoT device and the
Network server is encrypted with the NwkSKey. Therefore, each message is encrypted
by using the XOR operation with the corresponding key.
Currently in LPWAN there are specific security issues that arise due to the overall
architecture and protocol layer design:
Keys Storage Keys need to be safely stored by the IoT devices, the Network Server and
the Application Server. Moreover in LPWAN network the IoT device is placed to an
unprotected external or internal environment for very long time thus its impractical
and costly to increase the physical security level of the IoT devices.
Symmetric Encryption Factors AES is operating in counter mode (CTR) and not in
electronic codebook (ECB) mode. In this mode of operation, IoT devices generate
cyphertexts which are output of the XOR procedure on the string that contains a
counter, the AppSkey and the plaintext As a result, encryptions are vulnerable to
chosen cyphertext attack since if an attacker changes the payload data she can figure
out which bit position in the encrypted payload corresponds to the same bit position
in the plaintext. major security flaw.
Authentication The Network Server and the intermediate concentrator (or an attacker
on the intermediate network) are in a position to modify the encrypted payload
without the Application server being able to notice the change. If an adversary
could posses the session key, then he can generate a LoRaWAN message that will
pass the signature checking procedure at the network server.
Compromised IoT device LPWANs are suitable for large deployments of battery op-
erated static IoT devices that remain for long periods of times (in many cases span-
ning several years) in semi-controlled environments or even uncontrolled areas.
Untrusted Concentrators Traffic passing through this point can be easily recorded and
even manipulated.
2 An End-to-End Secure Communication Scheme
The LoRa LPWAN architecture is extended by introducing the so-called Median Server
that complements the functionality of the Network Server and Application Server by
taking over the role of the Registration Authority of the system both for IoT devices
and concentrators. A PKI Credential Authority (CA) is introduced to ensure that only
authenticated IoT devices interact with the system and connect only to an authenticated
concentrator that issued their certificates.
The overall security is further reinforced by establishing a VPN network for the
communication between the concentrators, the median server and the network server.
The VPN connections use SSL sessions with bidirectional authentication (i.e., each
side must present its own certificate). A block cypher and fingerprint (hash value) for
encrypting/decrypting packets are activated along with the HMAC construction to au-
thenticate them. In this way, passive attacks (packet sniffing, eavesdropping) are elim-
inated. However, even if packet encryption is unbreakable, it does not prevent active
attackers to insert into a communication channel and add, modify or delete packets.
Active attacks are thwarted by embedding Device Identifier (DevEUI) (timestamps) on
packets and make IoT devices able to keep track of timestamps in order to make sure
that they never accept a packet with the same timestamp twice.
Furthermore, the critical data like symmetric keys, private-public keys and IoT de-
vice credentials are protected using a HMAC before they are stored into the Network
server and Application server to further assure their integrity. In particular, the HMAC-
MD5 is used within the Application server on IoT device credentials (username, pass-
word). In this way, critical data disclosure is prevented in situations like database server
thefts or unscrupulous administrators.
In terms of preventing modifications on payload data, a MAC is used to authenticate
transmitted payload data against any modification. The Application server verifies that
the message was received from an authenticated IoT device and subsequently decrypts
it and locks it in order to detect possible post-modifications and illicit manipulations.
A fundamental requirement for the proposed model is to strictly link IoT device
tasks with system’s application data. The proposed architecture is associated with a
workflow mechanism that guarantees data transmission thought heterogenous parties
whereas supervising user’s device interaction. In LPWAN the data rate transitions be-
tween the IoT device and LPWAN infrastructure is low and makes the security synchro-
nization interaction mechanisms impractical thus the flow control determines a certain
lifecycle for payload application data, from its insertion into the LPWAN till the time
that is ready to be stored and utilized by the application server. IoT device payload
passes through certain phases introduced by the mechanism. Each phase has its own
predefined tasks committed by the user. The mechanism introduces associations be-
tween phases (i.e., each phase depends on the successful completion of its previous
one) and executes them in a linear fashion (1st, 2nd, . . . ), making a discrete workflow
for each payload.
References
1. M. Centenaro, L. Vangelista, A. Zanella, and M. Zorzi. Long-Range Communications in
Unlicensed Bands: the Rising Stars in the IoT and Smart City Scenarios. IEEE Wireless
Communications, 23, October 2016.
2. Ioannis Chatzigiannakis, Andrea Vitaletti, and Apostolos Pyrgelis. A privacy-preserving smart
parking system using an iot elliptic curve based security platform. Computer Communica-
tions, 89-90:165–177, 2016.
3. Jaehyu Kim and JooSeok Song. A simple and efficient replay attack prevention scheme for
lorawan. In ICCNS, 2017.
4. Jordy Michorius. Whats mine is not yours: Lora network and privacy of data on publishing
devices. 2016.
5. Sarra Naoui, MoMohamed Elhoucine Elhdhili, and Leila Azouz Saidane. Enhancing the se-
curity of the iot lorawan architecture. In 2016 International Conference on Performance
Evaluation and Modeling in Wired and Wireless Networks (PEMWN), pages 1–7, Nov 2016.
